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Emergence and resilience of social networks: a general theoretical framework
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We introduce and study a general model of social network formation and evolution based on the concept
of preferential link formation between similar nodes and increased similarity between connected nodes. The
model is studied numerically and analytically for three definitions of similarity. In common with real-world
social networks, we find coexistence of high and low connectivity phases and history dependence. We suggest
that the positive feedback between linking and similarity which is responsible for the model’s behaviour is also
an important mechanism in real social networks.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing consensus among social scientists that
many social phenomena display an inherent network dimen-
sion. Not only are they “embedded” in the underlying so-
cial network [1] but, reciprocally, the social network itself is
largely shaped by the evolution of those phenomena. The
range of social problems subject to these considerations is
wide and important. It includes, for example, the spread of
crime [2, 3] and other social problems (e.g. teenage pregnancy
[4, 5]), the rise of industrial districts [6, 7, 8], and the estab-
lishment of research collaborations, both scientific [9, 10] and
industrial [11, 12]. Throughout these cases, there are a num-
ber of interesting observations worth highlighting:
(a) Sharp transitions: The shift from a sparse to a highly
connected network often unfolds rather “abruptly,” i.e. in a
short timespan. For example, concerning the escalation of so-
cial pathologies in some neighborhoods of large cities, Crane
[4] writes that “...if the incidence [of the problem] reaches a
critical point, the process of spread will explode.” Also, con-
sidering the growth of research collaboration networks, Goyal
et al. [10] report a steep increase in the per capita number of
collaborations among academic economists in the last three
decades, while Hagerdoorn [11] reports an even sharper (ten-
fold) increase for R&D partnerships among firms during the
decade 1975-1985.
(b) Resilience: Once the transition to a highly connected
network has taken place, the network is robust, surviving
even a reversion to “unfavorable” conditions. The case of
California’s Silicon Valley, discussed in a classic account by
Saxenian [7], illustrates this point well. Its thriving perfor-
mance, even in the face of the general crisis undergone by
the computer industry in the 80’s, has been largely attributed
to the dense and flexible networks of collaboration across
individual actors that characterized it. Another intrinsically
network-based example is the rapid recent development of
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Open-Source software (e.g. Linux), a phenomenon sustained
against large odds by a dense web of collaboration and trust
[13]. Finally, as an example where “robustness” has negative
rather than positive implications, Crane [4] describes the dif-
ficulty, even with vigorous social measures, of improving a
local neighborhood once crime and other social pathologies
have taken hold.
(c) Equilibrium co-existence: Under apparently simi-
lar environmental conditions, social networks may be found
both in a dense or sparse state. Again, a good illustration
is provided by the dual experience of poor neighborhoods
in large cities [4], where neither poverty nor other socio-
economic conditions (e.g. ethnic composition) can alone ex-
plain whether or not there is degradation into a ghetto with
rampant social problems. Returning to R&D partnerships,
empirical evidence [11] shows a very polarized situation,
almost all R&D partnerships taking place in a few (high-
technology) industries. Even within those industries, partner-
ships are almost exclusively between a small subset of firms
in (highly advanced) countries.[31]
From a theoretical viewpoint, the above discussion raises
the question of whether there is some common mechanism at
work in the dynamics of social networks that, in a wide variety
of different scenarios, produces the three features explained
above: (a) discontinuous phase transitions, (b) resilience, and
(c) equilibrium coexistence. Our aim in this paper is to shed
light on this question within a general framework that is flexi-
ble enough to accommodate, under alternative concrete spec-
ifications, a rich range of social-network dynamics.
The recent literature on complex networks has largely fo-
cused on understanding what are the generic properties aris-
ing in networks under different link formation mechanisms.
Those properties are important to gain a proper theoretical
grasp of many network phenomena and also provide useful
guiding principles for empirical research. The analysis, how-
ever, has been mostly static, largely concerned with features
such as small-world [16] or scale-free [17] networks. In con-
trast, our approach in this paper to the issue of network forma-
tion is intrinsically dynamic, the steady state being a balance
of link formation and removal.
2We consider a set of agents – be they individuals or orga-
nizations – who establish bilateral interactions (links) when
profitable. The network evolves under changing conditions.
That is, the favorable circumstances that led at some point
to the formation of a particular link may later on deterio-
rate, causing that link’s removal. Hence volatility (exogenous
or endogenous) is a key disruptive element in the dynamics.
Concurrently, new opportunities arise that favour the forma-
tion of new links. Whether linking occurs depends on factors
related to the similarity or proximity of the two parties. For
example, in cases where trust is essential in the establishment
of new relationships (e.g. in crime or trade networks), linking
may be facilitated by common acquaintances or by the exis-
tence of a chain of acquaintances joining the two parties. In
other cases (e.g. in R&D or scientific networks), a common
language, methodology, or comparable level of technical com-
petence may be required for the link to be feasible or fruitful
to both parties.
In a nutshell, our model conceives the dynamics of the net-
work as a struggle between volatility (that causes link decay)
on the one hand, and the creation of new links (that is depen-
dent on similarity) on the other. The model must also specify
the dynamics governing inter-node similarity. A reasonable
assumption in this respect is that such similarity is enhanced
by close interaction, as reflected by the social network. For
example, a firm (or researcher) benefits from collaborating
with a similarly advanced partner, or individuals who inter-
act regularly tend to converge on their social norms and other
standards of behavior.
We study different specifications of the general framework,
each one embodying alternative forms of the intuitive idea
that “interaction promotes similarity.” Our main finding is that
in all of these different cases the network dynamics exhibits,
over a wide range of parameters, the type of phenomenology
discussed above. The essential mechanism at work is a pos-
itive feedback between link creation and internode similarity,
these two factors each exerting a positive effect on the other.
Feedback forces of this kind appear to operate in the dynam-
ics of many social networks. We show that they are sufficient
to produce the sharp transitions, resilience, and equilibrium
co-existence that, as explained, are salient features of many
social phenomena.
II. THE MODEL
Consider a set N = {1, . . . , n} of agents, whose interac-
tions evolve in continuous time t. Their network of interaction
at some t is described by a non-directed graph g(t) ⊂ {ij :
i ∈ N , j ∈ N}, where ij(≡ ji) ∈ g(t) iff a link exists be-
tween agents i and j. The network evolves in the following
manner. Firstly, each node i receives an opportunity to form a
link with a node j, randomly drawn from N (i 6= j), at rate 1
(i.e. with a probability dt in a time interval [t, t+ dt) ). If this
link ij is not already in place, it forms with probability
P{ij → g(t)} =
{
1 if dij(t) ≤ d¯
ǫ if dij(t) > d¯
(1)
where dij(t) is the “distance” (to be specified later) between
i and j prevailing at t. Thus if i and j are close, in the sense
that their distance is no higher than some given threshold d¯,
the link forms at rate 1; otherwise, it forms at a much smaller
rate ǫ ≪ 1. Secondly, each existing link ij ∈ g(t) decays
at rate λ. That is, each link in the network disappears with
probability λdt in a time interval [t, t+ dt).
We shall discuss three different specifications of the dis-
tance dij , each capturing different aspects that may be rele-
vant for socio-economic interactions. Consider first the sim-
plest possible such specification where dij(t) is the (geodesic)
distance between i and j on the graph g(t), neighbors j of i
having dij(t) = 1, neighbors of the neighbors of i (which are
not neighbors of i) having dij(t) = 2, and so on. If no path
joins i and j we set dij(t) =∞.
This specific model describes a situation where the forma-
tion of new links is strongly influenced by proximity on the
graph. It is a simple manifestation of our general idea that
close interaction brings about similarity – here the two met-
rics coincide. When d¯ > n − 1, the link formation process
discriminates between agents belonging to the same network
component (which are joined by at least one path of links in
g) and agents in different components. Distinct components of
the graph may, for example, represent different social groups.
Then Eq. (1) captures the fact that belonging to the same so-
cial group is important in the creation of new links (say, be-
cause it facilitates control or reciprocity [14, 15]).
Consider first what happens when λ is large. Let c be the
average connectivity (number of links per node) in the net-
work. The average rate nλc/2 of link removal is very high
when c is significant. Consequently, we expect to have a very
low c, which in turn implies that the population should be frag-
mented into many small groups. Under these circumstances,
the likelihood that an agent i “meets” an agent j in the same
component is negligible for large populations, and therefore
new links are created at a rate almost equal to nǫ. Invoking
a simple balance between link creation and link destruction,
the average number of neighbors of an agent is expected to be
c ≃ 2ǫ/λ, as is indeed found in our simulations (Fig 1).
As λ decreases, the network density c increases gradually,
but then, at a critical value λ1, it makes a discontinuous jump
(Fig. 1) to a state containing a large and densely intercon-
nected community covering a finite fraction of the population
(the giant component). Naturally, if volatility λ decreases fur-
ther, the network becomes even more densely connected. But,
remarkably, if volatility increases back again beyond the tran-
sition point λ1, the dense network remains stable. The dense
network dissolves back into a sparsely connected one only at
a second point λ2. This phenomenology characterizes a wide
region of parameter space (see inset of Fig. 1) and is qualita-
tively well reproduced by a simple mean field approach (see
appendix).
A similar phenomenology occurs when d¯ = 2, i.e. when
links are preferentially formed with “friends of friends”, in
an appropriate parameter range.[32] This is reminiscent of a
model that was recently proposed [18] to describe a situation
where (as e.g. in job search [30]) agents find new linking op-
portunities through current partners. In [18] agents use their
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FIG. 1: Mean degree c as a function of λ for ǫ = 0.2 when dij is
the distance on the graph and d¯ > n − 1. The results of a mean
field theory for n = ∞ (solid line) is compared to numerical sim-
ulations (×) starting from both low and high connected states with
n = 20000. The dashed line corresponds to an unstable solution
of the mean field equations which separates the basins of stability of
the two solutions. Indeed the low density state, for finite n, “flips”
to the high density state when a random fluctuation in c brings the
system across the stability boundary (i.e. when a sizable giant com-
ponent forms). These fluctuations become more and more rare as n
increases. Inset : Phase diagram in mean field theory. Coexistence
occurs in the shaded region whereas below (above) only the dense
(sparse) network phase is stable. Numerical simulations (symbols)
agree qualitatively with the mean field prediction. The high (low)
density state is stable up (down) to the points marked with× (⋄) and
is unstable at points marked with ◦ (+). The behavior of c along the
dashed line is reported in the main figure.
links to search for new connections, whereas here existing
links favor new link formation. In spite of this conceptual dif-
ference, the model in Ref. [18] also features the phenomenol-
ogy (a)-(c) above, i.e. sharp transitions, resilience, and phase
coexistence.
We now consider an alternative specialization of the gen-
eral framework where link formation requires some form of
coordination, synchronization, or compatibility. For example,
a profitable interaction may fail to occur if the two parties do
not agree on where and when to meet, or if they do not speak
the same languages, and/or adopt compatible technologies and
standards. In addition, it may well be that shared social norms
and codes enhance trust and thus are largely needed for fruit-
ful interaction.
To account for these considerations, we endow each agent
with an attribute xi which may take a finite number q of dif-
ferent values, xi ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q}. xi describes the internal
state of the agent, specifying e.g. its technological standard,
language, or the social norms she adopts. The formation of a
new link ij requires that i and j display the same attribute, i.e.
xi = xj . This is a particularization of the general Eq. (1) with
dij = δxi,xj and d¯ = 0. For simplicity we set ǫ = 0 since
in the present formulation there is always a finite probability
that two nodes display the same attribute and hence can link.
We assume each agent revises its attribute at rate ν, choosing
xi dependent on its neighbours’ xjs according to:
P{xi(t) = x} = 1
Z
exp

β ∑
j:ij∈g(t)
δx,xj(t)

 (2)
where β tunes the tendency of agents to conform with their
neighbors and Z provides the normalisation. This adjustment
rule has a long tradition in physics [19] and also occurs in the
socio-economic literature as a model of coordination (or so-
cial conformity) under local interaction [20, 21, 22]. This
is another manifestation of our general idea that network-
mediated contact favors internode similarity. We focus on the
case where such a similarity-enhancing dynamics proceeds at
a much faster rate than the network dynamics. That is, ν ≫ 1
so that, at any given t where the network g(t) is about to
change, the attribute dynamics on the xi have relaxed to a
stationary state. The statistics of this state is provided by the
Potts model in physics, which has been recently discussed for
random graphs [23, 24]. We refer to the appendix for details
and move directly to discussing the results.
For a given β, under strong volatility (λ≫ 1) the link den-
sity is very low, there is no giant component and agents i, j
chosen at random (for n large) are not coordinated (P (xi =
xj) = 1/q). Hence links form at a node at rate 2/q. A
simple balance of link formation and decay rates implies that
c = 2/(qλ) in this case. When λ decreases, network den-
sity c increases. First, it does so gradually but at a critical
point λ1(β) c becomes sufficiently large that the xis within
the giant component (whose existence is necessary for coor-
dination) become coordinated. Link formation increases since
now P (xi = xj) > 1/q and this in turn increases the coor-
dination. This positive feedback causes a sharp transition to
a coordinated, more highly connected state. Once this sharp
transition has taken place, further decreases in λ are simply
reflected in gradual increases in network density. On the other
hand, subsequent changes of λ in the opposite direction are
met by hysteresis. That is, if λ now grows starting at values
below λ1, the network does not revert to the sparse network at
the latter threshold. Rather, it remains in a dense state up to a
larger value λ2 > λ1, sustained by the same positive feedback
discussed above.
This phenomenology, though induced by a different mech-
anism, is quite similar in spirit to that reported in Fig. 1 for the
previous model. In the limit β → ∞, the second model be-
comes equivalent to the first one since with β →∞, all nodes
in the same component share the same value of xi(t), whilst
the probability to link two disconnected nodes is ǫ = 1/q. In
fact, the roles of 1/β and λ in the model are analogous. If
we fix λ and parametrize the behavior of the model through
1/β, the same phenomena of discontinuous transitions, hys-
teresis, and equilibrium co-existence occurs for corresponding
threshold values 1/β1 and 1/β2, analogous to λ1 and λ2 in the
former discussion.
Finally, we consider a setup where dij reflects proximity
of nodes i, j in terms of some continuous (non-negative) real
attributes, Wi(t), Wj(t). These attributes could represent the
level of technical expertise of two firms involved in an R&D
4partnership, or the competence of two researchers involved
in a joint project. It could also be a measure of income or
wealth that bears on the quality and prospects of a bilateral
relationship. Whatever the interpretation, it may be natural
in certain applications to posit that some process of diffusion
tends to equalize the levels displayed by neighboring agents.
This idea is captured by the following stochastic differential
equation:
dWi
dt
= ν
∑
j:ij∈g
[Wj(t)−Wi(t)] +Wi(t)ηi(t) (3)
where ηi(t) is uncorrelated white noise, i.e. 〈ηi(t)ηj(t′)〉 =
Dδijδ(t− t′). The first term of Eq. (3) describes the diffusion
component of the process, which draws the levels of neigh-
boring agents closer. This homogenizing force competes with
the random idiosyncratic growth term Wi(t)ηi(t). Random
growth processes subject to diffusion such as that of Eq. (3)
are well known in physics. In particular it is known [26] that
the fluctuation properties of Eq. (3) when D is larger than
a critical value Dc are qualitatively different to those when
D < Dc.
Choosing dij = | logWi − logWj | and updating both the
links and W s at comparable timescales, we have performed
extensive numerical simulations of the induced network dy-
namics. Fig. 2 reports typical results for a simple discretized
version of Eq. (3) with D > Dc (see caption of Fig. 2). As
in the two previous models, we find a discontinuous transition
between a sparse and a dense network state, characterized by
hysteresis effects. When the network is sparse, diffusion is in-
effective in homogenizing growth. Hence the distance dij is
typically beyond the threshold d¯, thus slowing down the link
formation process. On the other hand, with a dense network,
diffusion rapidly succeeds in narrowing the gaps between the
Wis of different nodes, which in turn has a positive effect on
network formation. As before, the phase transition and hys-
teresis is a result of the positive feedback that exists between
the dynamics of the Wi and the adjustment of the network. In
the stationary state we find that W (t) ≡ 〈Wi(t)〉 grows ex-
ponentially in time, i.e. logWi(t) ≃ vt. Notably, the growth
process is much faster (i.e. v is much higher) in the dense
network equilibrium than in the sparse one, as shown in the
upper panel of Fig. 2.
Finally, we note that when diffusion is very strong com-
pared to the idiosyncratic shocks in Eq. (3) – i.e. ν ≫ √D –
we expect a much smaller distance dij between agents in the
same component compared to agents in different components.
Thus the model becomes similar to the first one in this limit,
in the same way the second model did for β →∞.
III. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have proposed a general theoretical setup to
study the dynamics of a social network that is flexible enough
to admit a wide variety of particular specifications. We have
studied three such specifications, each illustrating a distinct
way in which the network dynamics may interplay with the
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FIG. 2: Mean degree c (top) and growth rate v (bottom) as a func-
tion of λ computed in numerical simulations of a discretized version
of the model with Eq. (3). More precisely, we iterate the equation
hi(t + ∆t) = maxj hj(t) + ri where j runs on the local neigh-
borhood of i, including i, ∆t is a small time interval, and ri(t) is a
Gaussian variable with mean 0 and variance ∆t. This equation de-
scribes the strong-noise limit of Eq. (3) and it is obtained by setting
hi = D
−1/2 logWi when D ≫ 1 (and D ≫ [log(ν∆t)]2). Here
we use ∆t = 0.2, ǫ = 0.01, d¯ = 0.4
√
D and n = 800 (solid circles)
and 1600 (open diamonds).
adjustment of node attributes. In all these cases, network
evolution displays the three features (sharp transitions, re-
silience, and equilibrium co-existence) that empirical research
has found to be common to many social-network phenomena.
Our analysis indicates that these features arise as a conse-
quence of the cumulative self-reinforcing effects induced by
the interplay of two complementary considerations. On the
one hand, there is the subprocess by which agent similarity
is enhanced across linked (or close-by) agents. On the other
hand, there is the fact that the formation of new links is much
easier between similar agents. When such a feedback process
is triggered, it provides a powerful mechanism that effectively
offsets the link decay induced by volatility.
The similarity-based forces driving the dynamics of the
model are at work in many socio-economic environments.
Thus, even though fruitful economic interaction often requires
that the agents involved display some “complementary diver-
sity” in certain dimensions (e.g. buyers and sellers), a key
prerequisite is also that agents can coordinate in a number of
other dimensions (e.g. technological standards or trading con-
ventions). Analogous considerations arise as well in the evo-
lution of many other social phenomena (e.g. the burst of social
pathologies discussed above) that, unlike what is claimed e.g.
by Crane [4], can hardly be understood as a process of epi-
demic contagion on a given network. It is by now well under-
stood [28, 29] that such epidemic processes do not match the
phenomenology (a)-(c) reported in empirical research. Our
model suggests that a satisfactory account of these phenom-
ena must aim at integrating both the dynamics on the net-
work with that of the network itself as part of a genuinely
5co-evolutionary process.
IV. APPENDIX
We characterize the long run behavior of the network in
terms of the stationary degree distribution P (k), which is the
fraction of agents with k neighbors. This corresponds to ap-
proximating the network with a random graph (see [25]), an
approximation which is rather accurate in the cases we dis-
cuss here. We focus on the limit n → ∞, for which the
analysis is simpler, but finite size corrections can be stud-
ied within this same approach. The degree distribution sat-
isfies a master equation [27], which is specified in terms of
the transition rates w(k → k ± 1) for the addition or re-
moval of a link, for an agent linked with k neighbors. While
w(k → k − 1) = λk always takes the same form, the transi-
tion rate w(k → k+1) for the addition of a new link depends
on the particular specification of the distance dij . For the first
model w(k → k + 1) = ǫ if the two agents are in different
components and w(k → k+1) = 1 if they are in the same. In
the large n limit the latter case only occurs with some proba-
bility if the graph has a giant component G which contains a
finite fraction γ of nodes. For random graphs (see Ref. [25]
for details) the fraction of nodes in G is given by γ = 1−φ(u)
where φ(s) =
∑
k P (k)s
k is the generating function and u is
the probability that a link, followed in one direction, does not
lead to the giant component. The latter satisfies the equation
u = φ′(u)/φ′(1). Hence uk is the probability an agent with
k neighbours has no links connecting him to the giant compo-
nent, and hence is itself not part of the giant component. Then
the rate of addition of links, in the first model, takes the form
w(k → k + 1) = 2[ǫ+ (1− ǫ)γ(1− uk)],
where the factor 2 comes because each node can either initiate
or receive a new link. The stationary state condition of the
master equation leads to the following equation for φ(s)
λφ′(s) = 2[ǫ+ (1− ǫ)γ]φ(s)− 2(1− ǫ)γφ(us) (4)
which can be solved numerically to the desired accuracy. No-
tice that Eq. (4) is a self-consistent problem, because the pa-
rameters γ and u depend on the solution φ(s). The solution
of this equation is summarized in Fig. 1. Either one or three
solutions are found, depending on the parameters. In the lat-
ter case, the intermediate solution is unstable (dashed line in
Fig. 1), and it separates the basins of attraction of the two
stable solutions within the present mean field theory. Numeri-
cal simulations reveal that the the mean field approach is very
accurate away from the phase transition although it overesti-
mates the size of the coexistence region.
Now we turn to the second model, where each node dis-
plays one out of a finite set of attributes. In order to simplify
the analysis, we approximate the prevailing network g with
a random graph with Poisson degree distribution and average
degree c, i.e. a graph where any given link ij is present with
probability c/(n − 1). Though not exact, this approximation
is rather accurate as confirmed by numerical simulations, and
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FIG. 3: Graphical solution for the stationary state of the coordination
model for q = 10 and β = 8.
it allows us to clarify the behavior of the model in a simple
and intuitive way. (A more precise solution, which relies on a
more accurate description of the network topology can also be
derived, yielding no essential differences.) The solution of the
Potts model on random graphs of Ref. [23, 24] (with tempera-
ture T = 1/(2kBβ)) allows us to compute the probability that
two randomly chosen nodes i and j have xi = xj . Given the
Poisson approximation, such a probability is given by a func-
tion π(c, β) = 〈δxi,xj 〉 of the average degree c and β, as plot-
ted in Fig. 3. Equalizing the link destruction and formation
rate λc/2 = π(c, β) yields an equation for the equilibrium
values of c, for any given β . A graphical approach shows
that when λ > λ2 there is a single solution, representing a
sparse network. At λ2 two other solutions arise, one of which
is unstable as above. At a further point λ1 the sparse-network
solution merges with the unstable one and both disappear for
λ < λ1, leaving only a solution with a stable and dense net-
work. This reproduces the same phenomenology observed in
the numerical simulations of the second model, which is also
qualitatively similar to that presented in Fig. 1 for the first
model.
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